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MONTGOMERY, AND WHY A COMPLETE
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PAROLE FOR JUVENILES IS THE ONLY
CONSTITUTIONAL OPTION
Alice Reichman Hoesterey*
ABSTRACT

In 2012, the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama
held that mandatory life without parole sentences for juvenile
offenders are unconstitutional. Several years later, the Court in
Montgomery v. Louisiana determined that Miller must be applied
retroactively. However, Montgomery did more than decide the issue
of retroactivity—it expanded Miller’s holding. Following the decision
in Montgomery, state courts have split over whether the decision
requires additional protections for juveniles facing life without parole
sentences. This Article outlines the differing state responses to
Montgomery, examining disagreements over when Montgomery’s
protections are triggered and what procedural safeguards are
required at sentencing. It then proceeds to argue that Montgomery
does in fact mandate additional procedures beyond what many states
have implemented. Montgomery is itself a groundbreaking decision
that requires significant changes to current juvenile life without
parole sentencing schemes. Even if states implement the additional
protections necessitated by Montgomery, the reasoning behind this,
as well as prior opinions, make a categorical ban on life sentences
without parole the only constitutional option for juveniles.
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INTRODUCTION
Since 2005, the United States Supreme Court has issued a series of
decisions that have expanded the reach of Eighth Amendment
protections and greatly narrowed the punishments available for
juveniles convicted of serious offenses. First, the Court held that
capital punishment for all juvenile offenders is unconstitutional under
the Eighth Amendment.1 Several years later, the Court held that a
sentence of life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, and is thus
unconstitutional.2 Then, in 2012, the Supreme Court in Miller v.
Alabama3 held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits mandatory life
without parole sentences for juveniles convicted of homicide.4 In so
holding, the Court espoused the rule that “children are different”
from adults and that courts must consider youth as a mitigating factor
prior to imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders.5
Following Miller, state courts were left to determine if the ruling
applied retroactively to the over 2000 incarcerated persons6 serving
mandatory life without parole sentences for crimes committed as
juveniles. State supreme courts split. Some state courts found that
the rule was procedural and consequently not retroactive.7 Other
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005); see infra Section I.A.
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010); see infra Section I.A.
567 U.S. 460 (2012).
Id. at 479.
Id. at 480.
See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT
PAROLE (JLWOP), at 17 (2010), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/jlwopchart.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YFD5-2GTV] (reporting that 2574 juvenile offenders have been
sentenced to life without parole, of which 2105 were sentenced as a mandatory
sentence).
7. Fourteen states found Miller retroactive: Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida,
Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, and Wyoming. JOSH ROVNER, THE SENTENCING
PROJECT, JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AN OVERVIEW 3 (2017),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Juvenile-Life-WithoutParole.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KQ8-XRCW]. Another six passed juvenile sentencing
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
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state courts found that Miller was substantive, and therefore
retroactive.8 As a result of the split, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Montgomery v. Louisiana9 to determine whether
Miller should apply retroactively.10
The Montgomery Court found that Miller applied retroactively.11
However, the Montgomery decision did far more. The Court greatly
expanded its more limited holding in Miller, concluding that life
without parole is unconstitutionally excessive for the vast majority of
juvenile homicide offenders.12 Montgomery makes clear that more is
required of a sentencing court than mere consideration of the
mitigating qualities of youth.13 However, many state sentencing
schemes remain noncompliant with the increased sentencing
requirements prescribed by Montgomery.14
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I reviews the Supreme
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as it relates to juveniles,
providing necessary background to the Montgomery decision. Part I
then proceeds to analyze the fundamental holdings of both Miller and
Montgomery. Part II examines state responses to Montgomery,
outlining five key areas where state court decisions have split in terms
of Montgomery’s requirements and application, and the reasons for
the differing conclusions. These responses are diagramed in further
detail in the appendices. Part III analyzes the fundamental holdings
of Montgomery and argues that Montgomery established heightened
sentencing requirements. This Part evaluates the five areas of state
discord, and explains how states should rule on these pressing
questions. Part IV demonstrates the deficiencies of the Montgomery
decision, and ultimately argues that such shortcomings necessitate a
complete categorical ban on life without parole for juvenile offenders.

legislation that applied retroactively: California, Delaware, Nebraska, Nevada, North
Carolina, and Wyoming. Id.
8. Seven states concluded that Miller was not retroactive: Alabama, Colorado,
Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, and Pennsylvania. Id.
9. 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
10. Id. at 725.
11. Id. at 734.
12. Id.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Parts II and III.
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I. THE ROAD TO MONTGOMERY
A. Roper and Graham: The Groundwork for Miller
The Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Roper v. Simmons15 laid the
groundwork for Miller and Montgomery by espousing the belief that
children are constitutionality different from adults for the purposes of
criminal sentencing.16 The Supreme Court held in Roper that a
capital sentence for a juvenile defendant violates the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment.”17
Under the doctrine of proportionality, the Eighth Amendment not
only prohibits abhorrent punishments, such as torture, but also
forbids excessive punishments that are disproportionate to the crime
In Roper, the Court concluded that juveniles
committed.18
categorically differ from adults in terms of culpability, thus rendering
a death sentence unconstitutionally excessive.19
The Court cited three primary factors to support its conclusion that
the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for juvenile
offenders.20 First, the Roper Court noted that juveniles have a “lack
of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility.”21
Second, the Court explained that juveniles are more susceptible than
adults to “negative influences and outside pressures.”22 Third, the
Roper Court emphasized that the character and personality traits of
juveniles are still developing and are “less fixed.”23 These factors led
to the conclusion that juveniles have a diminished degree of moral
culpability compared to adult offenders and a greater chance of
successful reform.24 In light of these developmental differences, the
Court determined that the rationales for imposing capital sentences
on adults—deterrence and retribution—do not adequately justify
15. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
16. Id. at 575.
17. Id. at 560–61, 568.
18. See id. at 560–65 (considering objective factors, including state legislative
actions, jury decisions, international opinion, and opinion polls, as well as the Court’s
independent judgment, to determine whether a punishment is grossly out of
proportion to a crime). See generally Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). For more on the Court’s Eighth Amendment
proportionality doctrine, see generally Scott W. Howe, The Eighth Amendment as a
Warrant Against Undeserved Punishment, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91 (2013).
19. See 543 U.S. at 575.
20. Id. at 569.
21. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 570.
24. Id.
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imposing such sentences on minors.25 As a result, a death sentence
for a minor is disproportionate and, thus, cruel and unusual under the
Eighth Amendment.
The Roper decision is significant in connection with Montgomery
and Miller in two primary ways. First, the Supreme Court based its
holding in Roper largely on scientific studies showing that juveniles
are biologically different from adults in ways that make them less
culpable for their actions.26 These same scientific studies are cited in
the Court’s subsequent decisions regarding the constitutionality of life
without parole for juvenile offenders.27 The Court gave great weight
to these studies and considered them to be an important factor in
determining appropriate punishments for youths.28 Most notably,
these very studies trusted by the Court support the assertion that it is
impossible to determine when a juvenile is incorrigible.29
Second, the Roper Court determined that even if a juvenile
demonstrates a sufficient level of depravity to justify a death
sentence, a case-by-case method of individualized sentencing for
juveniles would still be insufficient.30 Individualized sentencing
would pose too great a risk that the brutality of a crime would
overpower the mitigation of youth, especially given that even
juveniles who commit “heinous” crimes may be redeemable.31
Further, it would likely be impossible for a sentencing court to
differentiate such incorrigible juveniles from those whose crimes do
not reflect permanent depravity, as even expert psychologists are
unable to make such a determination.32 The Court thus determined
that a categorical ban was required because a case-by-case approach
would create an unacceptable risk that a juvenile offender would be
given the death penalty despite insufficient culpability.33 This
language emphasizing the difficulty of a case-by-case approach will

25. See id. at 571–72.
26. Id. at 569.
27. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471–72 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48, 68, 72–73 (2010).
28. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70.
29. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 735 (2016) (holding that only the
rare incorrigible juvenile offender may be sentenced to life without parole); see infra
Section III.A. Thus, the scientific impossibility of identifying these few irredeemable
juveniles is highly problematic for accurate implementation of the Court’s rule. See
infra Section IV.A.
30. See 543 U.S. at 570, 572–73.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 573.
33. Id. at 572–73.
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likely be relevant in future litigation addressing whether the
Constitution requires a categorical bar on juvenile life without
parole.34
Five years after Roper, the Court in Graham v. Florida35
considered the constitutionality of life in prison without parole for
Until
juvenile offenders who commit nonhomicide offenses.36
Graham, the Supreme Court was reluctant to apply the Eighth
Amendment’s proportionality doctrine outside of the capital
context.37 However, in Graham, the Court analogized the sentence of
life without parole for juveniles to a capital sentence for adults.38 The
Court explained that life without parole is the most severe sentence
that a juvenile can receive and “guarantees [the juvenile] will die in
prison without any meaningful opportunity to obtain release, no
matter what he might do to demonstrate that the bad acts he
committed as a teenager are not representative of his true
character.”39
As in Roper, the Graham Court developed a categorical rule
prohibiting life without parole sentences for juvenile nonhomicide
offenders.40 The Court cited the same concerns that motivated the
invalidation of the death penalty for juveniles in the life without
parole context.41 The Graham Court cited the precedent of Roper
that a juvenile offender “is not as morally reprehensible” as an adult
offender.42 The Court again cited “developments in psychology and
brain science” as evidence of juveniles’ lessened moral culpability
based on “fundamental differences between juvenile and adult
minds.”43 The Court in Graham again doubted that a case-by-case
approach could accurately distinguish the “few incorrigible juvenile
offenders from the many that have the capacity for change.”44
34. See infra Part IV.
35. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
36. Id. at 52–53.
37. Id. at 102 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“For the first time in its history, the Court
declares an entire class of offenders immune from a noncapital sentence using the
categorical approach it previously reserved for death penalty cases alone.”); see also
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Opening a Window or Building a Wall? The

Effect of Eighth Amendment Death Penalty Law and Advocacy on Criminal Justice
More Broadly, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 175–90 (2008).
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010).

Id.
Id. at 82.
See id. at 66.
Id. at 68 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988)).
Id.
Id. at 77.
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Miller’s Holding

Two years after Graham, the Court in Miller considered the case of
two juvenile offenders convicted of homicide who were sentenced to
life in prison without parole under a mandatory sentencing scheme.45
The Court held that sentencing schemes that mandate life in prison
without parole for juvenile offenders violate the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.46 The
Court explained that Roper and Graham “establish[ed] that children
are constitutionally different from adults for the purposes of
sentencing”47 and, as such, it would contravene what we know about
juvenile development to impose the most severe penalties on
juveniles “as though they were not children.”48
Although the Miller Court relied heavily on the reasoning set forth
in Graham and Roper, unlike in those cases, the Court stopped short
of issuing a categorical prohibition on life without parole for
juveniles.49 Instead, the Court contemplated precedents in the capital
context that elucidate the importance of individualized sentencing.50
Specifically, the Court examined two capital cases: Woodson v. North
Carolina51 and Eddings v. Oklahoma.52 Woodson invalidated a
statute imposing a mandatory death penalty sentence because it failed
to consider the character of the offender.53 Eddings held that the
background and development of a juvenile defendant must be
considered in assessing culpability in capital sentencing.54
Analogizing to capital jurisprudence, the Miller Court stressed the
importance of individualized sentencing for juveniles facing the most
severe punishments.55
Despite its holding that juveniles are entitled to individual
sentencing prior to receiving a sentence of life without parole, the

45. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012).
46. See id. at 479.
47. Id. at 471.
48. Id. at 474.
49. See id. at 479 (“Because that holding is sufficient to decide these cases, we do
not consider Jackson’s and Miller’s alternative argument that the Eighth Amendment
requires a categorical bar on life without parole for juveniles.”).
50. See id. at 476.
51. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
52. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
53. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
54. See Eddings, 455 U.S. at 116. This case was decided before Roper held that
death sentences for juvenile offenders are unconstitutional.
55. Miller, 567 U.S. at 475.
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Court provided little guidance on what this process would entail.56
The Court identified five factors, often referred to as the “Miller
factors,” that a court should consider during individualized
sentencing.57 These five factors are: (1) “age and its hallmark
features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to
appreciate
risks”;
(2) “family
and
home
environment”;
(3) circumstances of the offense; (4) legal competency, i.e. ability to
deal with police and lawyers; and (5) “possibility of rehabilitation.”58
However, nowhere does Miller state that these five factors must be
considered.59 Instead, the only mandate is that a sentencer must
“take into account how children are different, and how those
differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime
in prison.”60 What specific procedures to employ and what evidence
to consider is left to the discretion of the states.
After Miller, it was clear that states could no longer sentence
juveniles to life without parole under a mandatory sentencing
scheme.61 Furthermore, a sentencing court was now obligated to
consider youth-related mitigating evidence prior to imposing a life
without parole sentence.62 Even with its new mandates, the opinion
left many questions regarding proper implementation unanswered,
including retroactivity.
C.

Montgomery Expands Miller into a Categorical Rule

The Supreme Court in Miller did not address whether states were
required to apply the decision retroactively. The legal principle for
when to give retroactive effect to a new rule was established by the
plurality decision in Teague v. Lane.63 The Teague decision
established that new criminal procedure rules are generally not
56. See id. at 480.
57. See id. at 477.
58. Id. at 477–78.
59. Many states have incorporated the Miller factors into new post-Miller
legislation. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.1401(2) (West 2014); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2016); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.033(2) (West 2016); NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 28-105.02(2) (West 2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-1340.19B(c)
(West 2012); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1102.1(d) (West 2012); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030(3)(b) (West 2015). Additionally, some state supreme
courts have mandated that sentencing courts consider the factors articulated in
Miller. See, e.g., Aiken v. Byars, 765 S.E.2d 572, 577 (S.C. 2014); People v. Gutierrez,
324 P.3d 245, 268 (Cal. 2014); Ex parte Henderson, 144 So. 3d 1262, 1284 (Ala. 2013).
60. Miller, 567 U.S. at 480 (emphasis added).
61. See id. at 489.
62. See id. at 480.
63. 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (plurality opinion).
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applied retroactively on collateral review, with two exceptions.64
First, new rules of constitutional law must be applied retroactively if
they are substantive.65 Substantive rules are those that forbid
“criminal punishment of certain primary conduct,” and those that
prohibit “a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants
because of their status or offense.”66 Second, new procedural rules
are given retroactive effect only if they are considered “watershed”
rules of criminal procedure, meaning the new procedure implicates
the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.67
However, in the more than twenty-seven years since Teague was
decided, the Supreme Court has never deemed a procedural rule to
be “watershed.”68
States were divided on whether the rule announced in Miller
should apply retroactively.69 Several state supreme courts deemed
Miller a procedural rule that did not rise to the level of a “watershed”
rule.70 Therefore, these courts denied retroactive application of
Miller.71 This interpretation found support in the text of Miller,
which stated that the decision did not “categorically bar a penalty for
a class of offenders or type of crime”72 and that instead Miller
“mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain process.”73
However, a larger number of states found Miller retroactive.74
These states interpreted Miller as a substantive change in sentencing

See id. at 311.
See id.; see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 329 (1989).
Penry, 492 U.S. at 330.
The Supreme Court usually cites to the pre-Teague case of Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), as an example of a new rule that would be
considered “watershed.” See Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (plurality opinion); see also
Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990) (interpreting Teague). For more on Teague
and the “watershed” rule, see generally Ezra D. Landes, A New Approach to
Overcoming the Insurmountable Watershed Rule Exception to Teague’s Collateral
Review Killer, 74 MO. L. REV. 1 (2009).
68. Eighth Amendment—Retroactivity of New Constitutional Rules—Juvenile
Sentencing—Montgomery v. Louisiana, 130 HARV. L. REV. 377, 383–84 (2016).
69. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text.
70. See People v. Carp, 852 N.W.2d 801, 821 n.10 (Mich. 2014); State v. Tate,
130 So. 3d 829, 841 (La. 2013); Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 330 (Minn. 2013);
64.
65.
66.
67.

Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 9 (Pa. 2013).
71. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (plurality opinion).
72. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 483 (2012).
73. Id. (emphasis added).
74. See Falcon v. State, 162 So.3d 954, 961 (Fla. 2015); People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d
709, 722 (Ill. 2014); State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 731 (Neb. 2014); Jones v. State,
122 So.3d 698, 702 (Miss. 2013); State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 115 (Iowa 2013);
Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 281 (Mass. 2013).
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statutes because the decision prohibited a type of punishment—
mandatory life without parole—for a class of defendants—juveniles.75
These courts acknowledged that while Miller did have a procedural
component, the procedural element was a direct result of the
substantive change of law prohibiting mandatory life without parole
sentences.76 Hence, these state courts concluded that, despite the
Court’s statement that only a certain process must be followed, the
holding was substantive.77 The Supreme Court granted review in
Montgomery v. Louisiana to determine whether or not Miller should
apply retroactively.78
The Supreme Court in Montgomery sided with those state courts
that found Miller substantive and retroactive, but for much different
reasons. Montgomery explained that Miller was substantive because
it established that a life without parole sentence is unconstitutional
for the “vast majority” of “juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the
transient immaturity of youth.”79 Acknowledging the procedural
component in Miller, the Montgomery Court explained that the
individualized sentencing procedure required by Miller was merely to
“separate those juveniles who may be sentenced to life without parole
from those who may not.”80 Thus, according to Montgomery, Miller
did more than just invalidate mandatory life without parole
sentencing schemes and require individualized sentencing. Miller
created a categorical rule, holding that “sentencing a child to life
without parole is excessive for all but the rare juvenile offender whose
crime reflects irreparable corruption.”81
In dissent, Justice Scalia denounced the majority’s holding in
Montgomery.82 He argued that, despite the majority’s claim to ban
sentences of life without parole only in rare cases, the text of Miller
“stated, quite clearly, precisely the opposite.”83 He criticized the
majority, accusing it of “not applying Miller, but rewriting it.”84
Justice Scalia pointed out that the Court made life without parole a
“practical impossibility” because under Montgomery “even when the

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See generally cases cited supra note 74.
See generally cases cited supra note 74.
See generally cases cited supra note 74.
136 S. Ct. 718, 725 (2016).

Id. at 734.
Id. at 735.
Id. at 724 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 737, 743 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 743 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
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procedures that Miller demands are provided the constitutional
requirement is not necessarily satisfied.”85 He then accused the
majority of seeking a “devious way of eliminating life without parole
for juvenile offenders.”86
Justice Scalia’s claim that the majority restructured Miller’s holding
finds support in the text of the two decisions, as the Montgomery
opinion frequently runs contrary to Miller. For example, while Miller
claimed to require “only that a sentencer follow a certain process”
before sentencing a juvenile to life without parole,87 Montgomery
clarified that even if a court follows this exact process, the “sentence
still violates the Eighth Amendment for a child” who is not
incorrigible.88 Following a certain process cannot be the only
requirement for constitutional sentencing if, after following the
process, the sentence may still be unconstitutional. Similarly, Miller
expressly held that the opinion did “not categorically bar a penalty.”89
However, in Montgomery the Court claimed that Miller did in fact
categorically bar a sentence of life without parole for all juveniles
except the “rarest” youth whose crime reflects “permanent
incorrigibility.”90
This conflicting language has led to confusion regarding what
exactly Montgomery holds and what impact it should have on
Although the express holding of
sentencing procedures.91
Montgomery is that Miller is a substantive constitutional rule that
must be given retroactive effect, the accompanying opinion goes
significantly beyond the mere issue of retroactivity.92 Contradictory
text and vague holdings have left state courts with the task of
evaluating whether and to what extent Montgomery requires
additional protections for juveniles facing life without parole.
Predictably, state courts have split regarding several key issues
presented in Miller and Montgomery.93

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 743–44 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 483 (2012) (emphasis added).

Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734.
Miller, 567 U.S. at 483.
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734.
See infra Part II (detailing the conflicting state interpretations of the holdings
of Montgomery).
92. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 723; see also supra notes 79–88 and
accompanying text (outlining the language of the opinion).
93. See infra Part II.
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II. CONFLICTING STATE RESPONSES TO MONTGOMERY
The failure of the Supreme Court to clearly articulate exactly how
states must comply with this new substantive rule, as well as the
prevalence of unclear and often conflicting language throughout the
Montgomery opinion, has resulted in considerable splits among state
courts over what is required for constitutional juvenile sentencing.
Although state courts disagree on several major issues, the key
distinctions stem from the degree to which a state court views
Montgomery as a directive to establish broad protections for juvenile
homicide offenders facing the possibility of life imprisonment. While
some states remain content to leave more discretion to a sentencing
court, others view Montgomery as an obligation to provide additional
protections for those juveniles.
A. Procedural Protections Required at Sentencing Proceedings

1. Finding of Irreparable Corruption
Miller and Montgomery clearly require a sentencing proceeding
where youth is considered.94 However, states are split over what else,
if anything, is required to make a sentencing proceeding
constitutional. One crucial disagreement among state courts is
whether or not Montgomery mandates a sentencing court to make an
express determination of “irreparable corruption”95 prior to
sentencing juveniles to life without parole. Many state courts have
concluded that the clear language of Montgomery mandates such a
finding.96 One such court was the Georgia Supreme Court.97 In
Veal v. State, the court acknowledged that Montgomery changed the
requirements for sentencing juveniles to life without parole.98 The
94. See supra Section I.C.
95. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734.
96. See infra Figure 1 and Appendix B (detailing the differing conclusions of state
courts); see also Landrum v. State, 192 So. 3d 459, 466 (Fla. 2016); Veal v. State, 784
S.E.2d 403, 412 (Ga. 2016); Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410, 433 (Pa. 2017);
People v. Nieto, 52 N.E.3d 442, 454–55 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016); Luna v. State, 387 P.3d
956, 961 (Okla. Crim. App. 2016); People v. Hyatt, 891 N.W.2d 549, 555 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2016); People v. Padilla, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 209, 215–16 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016),
appeal docketed, 387 P.3d 741 (Cal. 2017). Notably, Iowa required a finding of
irreparable corruption after Miller but before Montgomery. Iowa was the only state
to require such a finding prior to Montgomery. The court reasoned that because
juveniles are less culpable and more capable of change, only those who are
irreparable should suffer such a harsh sentence. See State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545,
556–57 (Iowa 2015).
97. Veal, 784 S.E.2d at 411–12.
98. See id. at 410.
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court stated that prior to Montgomery, the sentencing court had
broad discretion to sentence a juvenile homicide offender to life
without parole, so long as the court first contemplated the defendant’s
youth.99
However, the Georgia Supreme Court then stated
dramatically, in a stand-alone paragraph, “[b]ut then came
Montgomery.”100 The Georgia court explained that Montgomery
changed its prior understanding of Miller and made clear that
sentencing a juvenile who is redeemable to life without parole is
unconstitutional.101 In order to determine if life without parole is
permissible, the court must determine whether the juvenile is one of
the rare offenders for whom the sentence is permitted.102 This
requires a “specific determination that he is irreparably corrupt.”103
Without such a determination on the record, the sentence violates the
Constitution.104
Echoing Georgia, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that,
based on “competent evidence,” a sentencing court must conclude
that a defendant “will forever be incorrigible, without any hope for
rehabilitation.”105 Without such a finding, life without parole is
“beyond the court’s power to impose.”106 Similarly, the Florida
Supreme Court explained that failing to make the distinction between
juveniles who are irreparably corrupt and those whose crimes reflect
transient immaturity “would mean life sentences for juveniles would
not be exceedingly rare, but possibly commonplace.”107 Other courts,
including the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals,108 the highest
court in Oklahoma for criminal matters, as well as lower appellate
courts in Illinois,109 California,110 and Michigan,111 have reached the
same conclusion.
A smaller number of courts have held that Montgomery does not
mandate a finding of irreparable corruption prior to imposing a

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 412.
Id. at 411.
Id. at 412.
Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410, 435 (Pa. 2017).

Id.

Landrum v. State, 192 So. 3d 459, 466 (Fla. 2016).

See Luna v. State, 387 P.3d 956, 962 (Okla. Crim. App. 2016).
See People v. Nieto, 52 N.E.3d 442, 455 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016).
See People v. Padilla, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 209, 221 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).
See People v. Hyatt, 891 N.W.2d 549, 552 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016).
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sentence of life without parole on a juvenile defendant.112 These
courts, including the Washington Supreme Court113 and lower
appellate courts in Tennessee,114 California,115 and Illinois,116 based
their holdings largely on the following quote in Montgomery: “Miller
did not require trial courts to make a finding of fact regarding a
child’s incorrigibility.”117 Although the Washington Supreme Court
acknowledged that Miller established a substantive rule—one that
“draws a line” between children who are irredeemable and those who
are immature—it found that no specific fact-finding was required to
effectuate the substantive rule.118
Rather the court merely
“encouraged” sentencing courts to “be as detailed and explicit as
possible” at sentencing.119
The Virginia Supreme Court in Jones v. Commonwealth also
concluded that Montgomery does not require a finding of irreparable
corruption.120 However, the Virginia court utilized a different
approach than the above courts. The Jones court claimed that
Montgomery’s explicit language holding juvenile life without parole
unconstitutional for all but the rarest incorrigible juvenile offenders is
not binding on the Virginia court.121 The court alleged that they are
bound only “by holdings, not language” and thus the binding
precedent of Montgomery is limited solely to the “question” for
decision in Montgomery: “whether Miller’s prohibition on mandatory
life without parole for juvenile offenders’ should be applied
retroactively.”122 Thus, the Virginia Supreme Court contends that
“the precedential holding in Montgomery amounts simply to: Miller is
retroactive.”123 Under such an interpretation, a finding of irreparable

112. See infra Figure 1 and Appendix B (detailing the differing conclusions of state
courts).
113. See State v. Ramos, 387 P.3d 650, 659 (Wash. 2017).
114. See Brown v. State, No. W2015-00887-CCA-R3-PC, 2016 WL 1562981, at *6
(Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2016), appeal denied, Aug. 19, 2016, cert. denied,
137 S. Ct. 1331 (2017).
115. See People v. Blackwell, 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d 444, 462 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016);
People v. Willover, 203 Cal. Rptr. 3d 384, 395–96 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).
116. See People v. Stafford, 61 N.E.3d 1058, 1068–69 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016); People v.
Holman, 58 N.E.3d 632, 642–43 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016), appeal docketed, 60 N.E.3d 878
(Ill. 2016).
117. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 735 (2016).
118. See Ramos, 387 P.3d at 665.
119. Id. at 665–66.
120. See 795 S.E.2d 705, 709 (Va. 2017).
121. See id. at 721.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 724 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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corruption is clearly not required, as the Virginia court does not
consider life without parole unconstitutional for redeemable
juveniles.124
Of the states that have considered the question of whether a
finding of incorrigibility is required, a greater number have found in
the affirmative.125 However, this question has yet to be addressed by
many state supreme courts, and legislators in those states have failed
to pass legislation mandating such a finding. Thus, a finding of
irreparable corruption is not explicitly required in the majority of
states that still allow for juvenile life without parole sentences.
Figure 1. Irreparable Corruption Determination Required Prior to
Imposing Life Without Parole (“LWOP”): State Supreme Court
Interpretations

1

The Iowa Supreme Court required a finding of irreparable corruption prior to Montgomery.

2

The Tennessee decision was in the Court of Appeals, but the Tennessee Supreme Court denied review.

2. Presumption Against Life Without Parole
An additional point of discord between states is whether Miller and
Montgomery create a presumption against life without parole at
sentencing. Prior to Montgomery, five state supreme courts held that

124. See id. at 709, 721.
125. See Appendix B.
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Miller dictates a presumption against juvenile life without parole.126
Relying on language in Miller that life sentences for juvenile

homicide offenders should be “uncommon,” and that juveniles as a
class are typically less culpable, the state supreme courts in
Connecticut, Iowa, Utah, Missouri, and Indiana all held that there
must be a presumption against imposing a life sentence without the
opportunity for parole.127
Following Montgomery, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Commonwealth v. Batts came to the same conclusion, holding that
there must be a presumption against life without parole, and a
juvenile can only receive such a sentence if the state can prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile cannot ever be
rehabilitated.128 In reaching this conclusion, the Batts majority
emphasized that such sentences are supposed to be “rare” and limited
to “exceptional circumstances.”129 Additionally, because the “vast
majority of adolescents change,” it should be presumed that a juvenile
is part of that vast majority.130
However, not all states have taken this approach. The Nebraska
Supreme Court held that a presumption against life without parole
was “not required by the U.S. Supreme Court . . . and we will not
create one.”131 As such, there is no presumption in favor of either
sentence.132 The California Supreme Court, after Miller but before
Montgomery, failed to establish a presumption in favor of release,
despite holding that a presumption in favor of life without parole
“would raise a serious constitutional question under Miller.”133
However, the California Supreme Court has recently granted review
of this issue, to determine if, post-Montgomery, there is now a
presumption in favor of an opportunity for release.134

126. See Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410, 416 (Pa. 2017); State v. Riley, 110
A.3d 1205, 1214 (Conn. 2015); State v. Houston, 353 P.3d 55, 77, 83 (Utah 2015);
State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 555 (Iowa 2015); State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232, 241
(Mo. 2013); Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 871 (Ind. 2012).
127. See cases cited supra note 126.
128. See Batts, 163 A.3d at 452–55.
129. Id. at 452.
130. Id.
131. State v. Mantich, 888 N.W.2d 376, 384 (Neb. 2016).
132. See id.
133. People v. Gutierrez, 324 P.3d 245, 263 (Cal. 2014).
134. See News Release, Sup. Ct. of Cal., Summary of Cases Accepted and Related
Actions During Week of January 23, 2017 (Jan. 27, 2017), www.courts.ca.gov/
documents/ws012317.pdf [https://perma.cc/859S-EB4D] (providing statement of the
issue in People v. Arzate, No. B259259, 2016 WL 5462821, at*1 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept.
29, 2016)). However, the California legislature recently passed legislation that
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Other states have upheld sentencing schemes that presume a
sentence of life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders,
leaving defendants to prove they are part of the constitutionally
protected class for whom such a punishment is excessive. The
Supreme Court of Washington recently upheld a sentencing scheme
that makes life without parole the presumptive sentence and places
“the burden on the juvenile offender to prove an exceptional
sentence is justified.”135 The Washington court reasoned that placing
the burden of proof on the juvenile defendant to prove that he should
receive an “exceptional” sentence below the default does not run
afoul of Miller because the Supreme Court did not create such a clear
procedure.136 Likewise, both the Arizona and Virginia Supreme
Courts place the burden on juvenile defendants to show that they are
ineligible for a life without parole sentence.137
Figure 2. Presumption Against Life Without Parole: State Supreme
Court Interpretations138

effectively ends juvenile life without parole in California, as it mandates parole
hearings after twenty-five years of incarceration for all juveniles serving life without
parole sentences. See S.B. 394, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). It is unclear if the
California Supreme Court will still consider this issue, or if the court will instead
consider the issue moot due to the legislative action.
135. State v. Ramos, 387 P.3d 650, 659 (Wash. 2017).
136. See id. at 663.
137. See Jones v. Commonwealth, 795 S.E.2d 705, 726 (Va. 2017) (Powell, J.,
dissenting); State v. Valencia, 386 P.3d 392, 396 (Ariz. 2016).
138. For additional information, see Appendix E.
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When the Protections of Miller and Montgomery Are Triggered

1. Application to Discretionary Life Without Parole Sentences
There is disagreement among state courts regarding what types of
sentences trigger the protections of Miller and Montgomery. One
such division concerns whether Miller and Montgomery’s protections
apply only to juveniles sentenced under mandatory sentencing
statutes, or if such protections also apply to juveniles sentenced to life
without parole under discretionary sentencing schemes.139
Even before Montgomery’s expansion of Miller, several state
supreme courts held Miller applicable to both mandatory and
discretionary life without parole sentences.140 The South Carolina
Supreme Court, for example, in holding Miller applicable to nonmandatory life without parole sentences, explained that “Miller does
more than ban mandatory life sentencing schemes for juveniles; it
establishes an affirmative requirement that courts fully explore the
impact of the defendant’s juvenility on the sentence rendered.”141
Similarly, other states noted that Miller requires a sentencing court to
actually consider the defendant’s youth prior to imposing life without
parole—just allowing discretion is inadequate.142 However, other
state courts concluded that the requirements of Miller are triggered
only by mandatory life without parole sentences, as evidenced by the
repeated use of the word “mandatory” in the Miller decision.143
Following Montgomery, some states reversed their earlier position,
instead holding that Montgomery’s clarification of Miller illustrates
that the protections of Miller apply to discretionary sentences as well.
The Georgia Supreme Court reversed its prior holding,144 explaining
that its earlier understanding of Miller was incorrect.145 The Georgia
court held that Miller, as interpreted by Montgomery, is applicable to

139. See Appendix C.
140. See, e.g., State v. Riley, 110 A.3d 1205, 1213 (Conn. 2015); Aiken v. Byars, 765
S.E.2d 572, 577–78 (S.C. 2014); People v. Gutierrez, 324 P.3d 245, 249 (Cal. 2014).
141. Aiken, 765 S.E.2d at 577.
142. See Riley, 110 A.3d at 1216; Beach v. State, 348 P.3d 629, 638 (Mont. 2015);
State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 555-56 (Iowa 2015); State v. Long, 8 N.E.3d 890, 894
(Ohio 2014).
143. See, e.g., State v. Purcell, No. CA–CR 13–0614 PRPC, 2015 WL 2453192, at *1
(Ariz. Ct. App. May 21, 2015), vacated, Purcell v. Arizona, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016)
(mem.); Pennington v. Hobbs, 451 S.W.3d 199 (Ark. 2014); Foster v. State, 754 S.E.2d
33, 37 (Ga. 2014); Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 879 (Ind. 2012).
144. See Foster, 754 S.E.2d at 37.
145. See Veal v. State, 784 S.E.2d 403, 410 (Ga. 2016).
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discretionary sentences.146 Similarly, the Arizona Supreme Court,
which initially refused review on the appellate court decisions finding
Miller applicable only to mandatory sentences,147 authored an
opinion post-Montgomery holding Miller’s protections pertinent to
discretionary sentences.148 This decision came after the United States
Supreme Court vacated and remanded a series of Arizona cases for
reconsideration in light of Montgomery.149 One such case was
Purcell v. Arizona, in which the sentencing court did in fact consider
the defendant’s youth at sentencing as a statutory mitigating factor.150
Additionally, other states including Florida,151 Washington,152 and
Oklahoma153 determined, with the guidance of Montgomery, that
Miller’s protections are not limited to mandatorily imposed life
without parole sentences.
Despite the clear trend towards finding Miller applicable to
discretionary sentences of life without parole, such a finding is not
universal. The United States Supreme Court recently remanded
Jones v. Virginia, a life without parole case, back to the Virginia
Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Montgomery.154 In this
case, the juvenile defendant took a plea deal for life without parole in
order to avoid a death sentence (as he was convicted prior to
Roper).155 As a result of the plea, the sentencing court never
considered youth or its mitigating circumstances at sentencing.156
Upon reconsideration, the Virginia Supreme Court maintained that
Miller and Montgomery apply only to punishments imposed under a
mandatory life without parole sentencing statute.157 The Virginia
court claimed that because the defendant was sentenced under a
statute that allowed for the opportunity to present mitigating
evidence, Jones’s sentence was not unconstitutional.158 According to

146. See id.
147. See State v. Purcell, No. CA–CR 13–0614 PRPC, 2015 WL 2453192, at *1
(Ariz. Ct. App. May 21, 2015), review denied (Ariz. Jan. 5, 2016), vacated, 137 S. Ct.
369 (2016).
148. See State v. Valencia, 386 P.3d 392, 393 (Ariz. 2016).
149. See Tatum v. Arizona, 137 S. Ct. 11 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
150. See id. at 12 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing Purcell).
151. See generally Atwell v. State, 197 So. 3d 1040 (Fla. 2016).
152. See generally State v. Ramos, 387 P.3d 650 (Wash. 2017).
153. See generally Luna v. State, 387 P.3d 956 (Okla. Crim. App. 2016).
154. See 136 S. Ct. 1358 (2016).
155. See Jones v. Commonwealth, 795 S.E.2d 705, 713 (Va. 2017).
156. See id.
157. See id. at 711.
158. See id. at 713.
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the majority, because Jones was not denied the right to present
mitigation, but instead opted not to utilize the right, Montgomery and
Miller do not apply.159 Additionally, the Missouri Supreme Court
recently held that “once mandatory life in prison without the
possibility of parole was off the table,” Miller no longer had any
application to the defendant’s murder conviction.160

2. De Facto Life Without Parole Sentences
States also split as to whether Miller and Montgomery apply only
to sentences labeled “life without parole,” or if their protections are
triggered by any lengthy sentence, including aggregate sentences
imposed for multiple convictions, that denies a defendant a
“meaningful opportunity to obtain release.”161 On the one hand,
several state supreme courts have held lengthy prison terms as “de
facto” life without parole sentences, requiring individualized
sentencing as mandated by Miller.162 The Supreme Court of
Washington recently held that Miller applied to a juvenile defendant’s
eighty-five year sentence, concluding that Miller “clearly . . . applies
to any juvenile homicide offender who might be sentenced to die in
prison without a meaningful opportunity to gain early release based
on demonstrated rehabilitation.”163 The Supreme Court of Illinois
concluded that a mandatory aggregate sentence of ninety-seven years
imprisonment amounted to a de facto life without parole sentence
because the juvenile “defendant will most certainly not live long
enough to ever become eligible for release.”164 Similarly, the Indiana
Supreme Court noted that a lengthy sentence of 150 years “forswears

159. See id.
160. State v. Nathan, 522 S.W.3d 881, 891 (Mo. 2017).
161. The phrase “meaningful opportunity for release” is found in Graham v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 50 (2010).
162. See Appendix D.
163. State v. Ramos, 387 P.3d 650, 660 (Wash. 2017).
164. People v. Reyes, 63 N.E.3d 884, 888 (Ill. 2016); see also People v. Caballero,
55 Cal. 4th 262 (2012) (holding that a 110-years-to-life sentence was cruel and
unusual under Miller). Courts have also held that de facto life sentences in
nonhomicide cases clearly implicate the protections of Graham. See generally State v.
Moore, 76 N.E.3d 1127 (Ohio 2016) (112-year sentence was effectively a life without
parole sentence and thus implicated Graham); Henry v. State, 175 So. 3d 675 (Fla.
2015) (remanding a 90-year sentence because Graham is not limited to “life in
prison” but instead the question is whether offender has a meaningful opportunity at
release); State v. Boston, 363 P.3d 452 (Nev. 2015) (stating that a sentence of 100
years in prison before parole violates Graham).
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altogether the rehabilitative ideal” of Miller.165 The majority of state
courts that have considered this issue focus on whether or not a
juvenile actually has an opportunity for release, rather than the exact
label of the sentence, and find Miller applicable to de facto
sentences.166
However, among states that read Miller as applicable to lengthy
sentences, there is a significant discrepancy over how long a sentence
must be to prompt Miller protections. On the low end, the Supreme
Court of Wyoming held that an aggregate term of forty-five years was
a de facto sentence of life without parole and implicated Miller.167
However, some states that replaced their mandatory life without
parole sentencing statute created mandatory minimum sentences of a
similar length. For example, juveniles convicted of capital murder in
both Florida and Nebraska must be sentenced to a minimum of forty
years imprisonment.168
On the other hand, several states have held that a sentence must be
explicitly labeled as “life without parole” to trigger the Court’s Eighth
Amendment protections.169 The Nebraska Supreme Court concluded
that a sentence with the possibility of parole, however remote, does
not trigger Miller, stating that the defendant’s “characterization of his
sentence [of ninety years] as a de facto life sentence is immaterial” to
the analysis.170 The Missouri Supreme Court in State v. Nathan
similarly held that Miller does not apply to consecutive sentences that
together amount to the “functional equivalent” of life without
parole.171 In Nathan the defendant was granted a resentencing
hearing following Miller for his first-degree murder conviction.172 At
resentencing the jury failed to find Nathan irreparably corrupt,
leading the court to vacate his first-degree murder conviction and
resentence him to life with the possibility of parole for that
conviction.173 However, Nathan was convicted of other crimes
associated with a home-invasion robbery and murder, including

165. Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 8 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Miller v. Alabama,
132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012)).
166. See Appendix D.
167. See, e.g., Bear Cloud v. State, 334 P.3d 132 (Wyo. 2014).
168. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082(1)(b)(1) (West 2017); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 28-105.02 (West 2017).
169. See, e.g., State v. Garza, 888 N.W.2d 526, 535–36 (Neb. 2016), State v. Nathan,
522 S.W.3d 881 (Mo. 2017).
170. Garza, 888 N.W.2d at 535.
171. See Nathan, 522 S.W.3d at 893.
172. See id. at 883.
173. See id. at 896.
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burglary, kidnapping, assault, and armed criminal action.174 Despite
finding Nathan ineligible for life without parole, the court ordered all
the sentences to run consecutively—giving Nathan a sentence of 300
years in prison.175 The court held that Miller does “not address the
constitutional validity of consecutive sentences, let alone the
cumulative effect of such sentences,” and thus Nathan’s sentence did
not violate Miller.176

3. Criminal Offenses Eligible for Life Without Parole
State legislatures have also taken different approaches towards
determining what crimes should be eligible for life without parole.
Most states only allow life without parole sentences for minors
convicted of first-degree murder, rather than lesser homicide
offenses.177 However, this is not the case in all states. In Louisiana,
juveniles convicted of first-degree or second-degree murder remain
eligible to receive a life without parole sentence.178 Second-degree
murder includes offenders who had “intent to kill or to inflict great
bodily harm” and death by unlawful distribution of a controlled
substance.179 Notably, only adults convicted of first-degree murder
are eligible for the death penalty in Louisiana.180 This means minors
are eligible for life without parole for a greater number of offenses
than adults are eligible for the death penalty, despite both sentences
being reserved for only the most morally culpable homicide
defendants.
Other states have narrowed the eligible offenses prospectively, but
maintain life without parole as a possible sentence for second-degree
murder in re-sentencing hearings mandated under Montgomery’s

174. See id. at 883.
175. See id. at 883, 899.
176. Id. at 891.
177. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-752 (2017); ALA. CODE § 13A-5-43.1
(LexisNexis 2017); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-104 (West 2017); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.5 (West 2017); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082(1)(b)(1) (West 2017); GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-5-1 (West 2017); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-304 (West 2017); Legis.
B. 44, 103 Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2013) (amending NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-101, 83-1,135,
enacting NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-105.02, 83-1, 110.04), https://nebraskalegislature.gov/
FloorDocs/103/PDF/Slip/LB44.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BNK-X2NG]; N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 630:1-a(III) (2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-1340.19B (2017); OHIO REV.
CODE. ANN. § 2929.03(E) (West 2017); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.9 (West 2017);
18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1102.1 (West 2017); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 10.95.030(3)(a) (West 2017).
178. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 878.1(a) (2017).
179. LA. STAT. ANN. § 14.30(a) (2017).
180. LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.C.(1) (2017).
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retroactivity holding. For example, Pennsylvania revised its juvenile
sentencing statute and no longer allows life without parole sentences
for juveniles convicted of second-degree murder.181 This is in line
with Pennsylvania’s death penalty sentencing scheme.182 However,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the new sentencing statute
“applies only to minors convicted of murder on and after the date
Miller was issued . . . .”183
Other states have modeled their juvenile life without parole
sentencing statutes on death penalty statutes, reasoning that both
punishments are reserved for the worst offenders. For example,
Missouri has not only narrowed the class of juveniles eligible to those
convicted of first-degree murder, but has required a finding of an
aggravating factor prior to eligibility for such a sentence, much like
that which is required to sentence an adult to death.184 Thus, the
criminal offenses for which a juvenile may receive life without parole,
although limited to homicide by Graham, still vary by state.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATES OF MONTGOMERY

Montgomery requires states to do more to protect juveniles from

excessive sentences.

Part III examines the requirements of

Montgomery, and argues how states should change their current
sentencing practices to comply with Montgomery’s mandates.
A. Courts Must Make a Determination of “Irreparable Corruption”
Prior to Sentencing a Juvenile to Life Without Parole

Montgomery made clear that mere consideration of youth is not

enough to render a sentence of life without parole constitutional; the
Eighth Amendment requires more.185 Specifically, a sentencing court
must determine that a youth is irreparably corrupt or permanently
incorrigible prior to imposing a sentence of life without parole.186
The importance of making such a finding is repeatedly emphasized
throughout the text of Montgomery. The Court held life without
parole “excessive for all but ‘the rare juvenile offender whose crime
181. 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1102.1 (West 2017).
182. 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1102 (West 2017).
183. Commonwealth v. Batts, 66 A.3d 286, 293 (Pa. 2013).
184. MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.034 (West 2017).
185. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016) (citing Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472–73 (2012)) (“Miller, then, did more than require a
sentencer to consider a juvenile offender’s youth before imposing life without
parole . . . .”).
186. See id.
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reflects irreparable corruption’ . . . .”187 The Court again stated that,
“Miller did bar life without parole . . . for all but the rarest of juvenile
offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.”188 In
fact, the majority mentions eight times in the opinion that only
irreparably corrupt juveniles may constitutionally receive sentences of
life without parole.189 Because life without parole is an excessive
punishment for juveniles whose crimes reflect “transient
immaturity,”190 a sentencer must determine whether a juvenile is
irreparably corrupt and thus one of the rare juveniles for whom a
sentence of life without parole is constitutional.
Despite this repetitive language, several states have determined no
such finding is required.191 These holdings rest on one line in
Montgomery that states that no formal fact-finding is required.192
However, when considering the overall language of the Montgomery
opinion, it is clear that this sentence should not be considered the
controlling rule. The majority mentions just once that there is no
formal fact-finding required—far fewer than the eight times the Court
mentions that only irredeemable youth may be sentenced to life

187. Id. at 724 (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 479).
188. Id. at 734.
189. There are eight separate sentences in the Montgomery opinion that highlight
the importance of determining if a juvenile’s crime reflects “irreparable corruption,”
“irretrievable depravity,” and “permanent incorrigibility” or “transient immaturity.”
Id. at 733 (“The Court recognized that a sentencer might encounter the rare juvenile
offender who exhibits such irretrievable depravity that rehabilitation is impossible
and life without parole is justified.”) (emphasis added); id. at 734 (“Even if a court
considers a child’s age . . . that sentence still violates the Eighth Amendment for a
child whose crime reflects ‘unfortunate yet transient immaturity.’”) (emphasis
added); id. (“Because Miller determined that sentencing a child to life without parole
is excessive for all but ‘the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable
corruption,’ it rendered life without parole an unconstitutional penalty for ‘a class of
defendants’ . . . whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth.”) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted); id. (“Miller did bar life without parole, however, for all
but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent
incorrigibility.”) (emphasis added); id. (“Miller drew a line between children whose
crime reflect transient immaturity and those rare children whose crimes reflect
irreparable corruption.”) (emphasis added); id. at 735 (“Miller’s substantive holding
that life without parole is an excessive sentence for children whose crimes reflect
transient immaturity.”) (emphasis added); id. (“That Miller did not impose a formal
factfinding requirement does not leave States free to sentence a child whose crime
reflects transient immaturity to life without parole.”) (emphasis added); id. at 736
(“[P]risoners like Montgomery must be given the opportunity to show their crime did
not reflect irreparable corruption . . . .”) (emphasis added).
190. Id. at 734.
191. See supra Section II.A.
192. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735.
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without parole.193 Markedly, the Court follows the assertion that
there is no required finding of fact with the following statement:
“[t]hat Miller did not impose a formal factfinding requirement does
not leave States free to sentence a child whose crime reflects transient
immaturity to life without parole.”194 Because a state is not free to
sentence a juvenile whose crime reflects transient immaturity to life
without parole, a sentencer must determine that a juvenile does not
fall in that protected class. Without making such a determination,
there is a substantial risk that the state has sentenced a child whose
crime reflects transient immaturity to a constitutionally excessive
sentence. The lack of a “formal factfinding requirement” noted in the
opinion is thus better read as the Court failing to tell the states exactly
how they make this determination. Nonetheless, the determination
must still be made.
Additional evidence that Montgomery requires a finding of
irreparable corruption comes from interpretations of Montgomery
written by members of the Supreme Court. Justice Scalia, who was
joined in dissent by Justices Thomas and Alito, read Montgomery as
establishing an “‘incorrigibility’ requirement.”195 Additional evidence
also comes from more recent Supreme Court decisions. In Adams v.
Alabama,196 a decision to vacate and remand for reconsideration in
light of Montgomery, Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg,
noted that there was “no indication” that the factfinders “asked the
question Miller required them not only to answer, but to answer
correctly: whether petitioners’ crimes reflected ‘transient immaturity’
or ‘irreparable corruption.’”197 Five justices, outside the language of
the Montgomery majority opinion, have thus stated their belief that
Montgomery requires a determination of irreparable corruption prior
to a life without parole sentence.198
The Supreme Court has clearly established that under the Eighth
Amendment the sentence of life without parole is disproportionate
for juveniles whose crimes reflect transient immaturity, rather than
irreparable corruption. Sentencing courts, after giving mitigating
effect to the characteristics and circumstances of youth, must
determine whether a juvenile is irreparably corrupt. A sentence of
life without parole for a child who is not found to be irreparably

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

See discussion supra note 189.
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735 (emphasis added).
Id. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
136 S. Ct. 1796 (2016).

Id. at 1800 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
See id.; see also Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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corrupt is void. However, the vast majority of states that continue to
have life without parole sentences available for juveniles have failed
to require a finding of irreparable corruption by the sentencer.
B.

A Possibility of Release Must Be the Presumptive Sentence

To comply with Miller and Montgomery, states must create a
presumption against life without parole sentences for juvenile
offenders. The burden must be on the state to rebut this presumption
by showing that the juvenile defendant is one of the rare juvenile
offenders whose crime reflects permanent incorrigibility. A failure to
create such a presumption and corresponding burden ignores the
fundamental holdings of Miller and Montgomery and will necessarily
result in unconstitutional sentencing.
The Court in Montgomery made clear that sentences of life without
parole for juveniles should be extraordinarily rare.199 The use of the
word “rare” was not just dicta, but was used with intention, as
evidenced by consistent repetition throughout the opinion.200 The
Court stressed how rare such sentences should be by noting six
separate times that life without parole is only constitutional for the
“rare” juvenile.201 The Court states an additional two times that life
without parole is unconstitutional for the “vast majority” of juvenile
homicide defendants.202 The Court makes abundantly clear that such
a sentence should only be issued in “exceptional circumstances.”203
Intuition tells us that if an outcome is exceptionally rare, it should not
be presumed. However, states across the nation are ignoring this
fundamental principle by failing to create a presumption against life

199. See discussion infra note 197.
200. See discussion infra note 197.
201. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 726 (“ . . . the Court explained that a lifetime in
prison is a disproportionate sentence for all but the rarest of children, those whose
crimes reflect “‘irreparable corruption.’”) (emphasis added); id. at 733 (“The Court
recognized that a sentence might encounter the rare juvenile offender who exhibits
such irretrievable depravity that rehabilitation is impossible and life without parole is
justified.”) (emphasis added); id. at 734 (“ . . . sentencing a child to life without parole
is excessive for all but “‘the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable
corruption . . . .’”) (emphasis added); id. at 734 (“Miller did bar life without parole,
however, for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect
permanent incorrigibility.”) (emphasis added); id. (“After Miller, it will be the rare
juvenile offender who can receive that same sentence.”) (emphasis added); id.
(“Miller drew a line between children whose crimes reflect transient immaturity and
those rare children whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption.”) (emphasis added).
202. Id. at 734, 736.
203. Id. at 736.
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without parole for juveniles.204 This violates the Court’s mandate that
such sentences be rare.
Additionally, failing to presume that a juvenile is redeemable
violates the core principles upon which Miller and Montgomery
rest—that children are developmentally different and must be treated
differently from adults.205 Montgomery plainly established that life
without parole is unconstitutional for juvenile offenders whose crimes
reflect “transient immaturity.”206 However, both immaturity and its
transient nature are central features of adolescent brain development,
present in all juvenile offenders.207 Both Miller and Montgomery,
discussing Graham, acknowledged that juveniles characteristically
lack maturity and impulse control, as the “parts of the brain involved
in behavior control” have not fully matured.208 Additionally, the
Montgomery Court recognized that a child’s “traits are ‘less fixed’
and his actions less likely to be evidence of ‘irretrievable
depravity.’”209 These traits of transient immaturity, characteristic of
all juveniles, led the Court to conclude that juveniles are less culpable
and in need of greater constitutional protection.210 Presuming that a
juvenile offender’s crime was not the result of transient immaturity
contradicts the science on which the Roper, Graham, Miller, and
Montgomery cases rest.
Having life without parole as the presumptive sentence for juvenile
homicide offenders, or failing to have any presumption at all, places
the responsibility of proving transient immaturity on the juvenile
defendants themselves. This is highly problematic as juveniles are in
an exceptionally poor position, due to qualities inherent in youth, to
undertake such an important and difficult task.211 The Court
acknowledged in Graham, and reiterated in Miller, that the “features

204. See supra Part II.
205. See, e.g., Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736; Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479
(2012).
206. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734.
207. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 480; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570
(2005) (“[T]he relevance of youth as a mitigating factor derives from the fact that the
signature qualities of youth are transient”) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350,
368 (1993)).
208. Miller, 567 U.S. at 471; see Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 733.
209. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 733 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 461).
210. See supra Part II (explaining the reasoning in Miller and Montgomery).
211. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 78 (2010); see also Brief for NAACP
Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. et al., Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 7–24,
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621); Thomas Grisso, The
Competence of Adolescents as Trial Defendants, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 3, 3
(1997).
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that distinguish juveniles from adults also put them at a significant
disadvantage in criminal proceedings.”212 This results in, as the
Supreme Court stated, the juvenile’s unique “incapacity to assist his
own attorneys.”213 Placing responsibility on juveniles, who by their
very nature are impulsive and immature, to prove an issue of
constitutionality is irresponsible at best.
Furthermore, requiring a juvenile to prove that he can be
rehabilitated is especially questionable considering the known
difficulty of making such a determination. The Court has repeatedly
recognized the “great difficulty . . . of distinguishing at this early age
between ‘the juvenile offender . . . ’” who is irreparable and the
juvenile offender who is redeemable.214 Even expert psychologists
have difficulty identifying those juveniles whose crimes reflect
transient immaturity.215 It is objectionable to require a juvenile to
prove a fact that even experts cannot reliably show. Placing the
burden on a juvenile to show that he can be rehabilitated creates an
unacceptably high risk that he will be unconstitutionally sentenced to
life without parole.
In order to effectuate the Court’s mandate that only the rare
irreparably corrupt youthful offender receive a sentence of life
without parole, a state must create a presumption against life without
parole. Anything else would undermine the Court’s ruling that such
sentences be reserved for the rare incorrigible juvenile.
C.

Both Mandatory and Discretionary Life Without Parole
Sentences Must Comply with Montgomery and Miller

Montgomery makes explicit that the protections it affords to child
defendants apply whenever a juvenile is sentenced to life without
parole, regardless of whether the juvenile is sentenced under a
mandatory or discretionary sentencing statute. Montgomery outright
requires courts to consider age-related mitigating evidence prior to
sentencing a juvenile to life without parole.216 If a sentencing judge is
merely allowed to consider evidence of youth under a discretionary
scheme but either fails to do so or does not afford the evidence the
proper mitigating weight, the sentence would automatically violate

212.
78).
213.
214.
215.
216.

Graham, 560 U.S. at 78; Miller, 567 U.S. at 478 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at
Miller, 567 U.S. at 478.
Id. at 479 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005)).
See Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Roper, 543 U.S. at 573.
See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 733 (2016).
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Miller and Montgomery.217 Although the Virginia Supreme Court

attempted to say that only an “opportunity” to present evidence is
required,218 this is plainly in conflict with the Supreme Court’s
repeated statements that comprehensive examination of youth is
obligatory for constitutional sentencing.219
Furthermore, even discretionary sentences issued after the full
exploration of youth-based mitigation can violate Montgomery. The
Court specifically stated that life without parole sentences issued after
the contemplation of the defendant’s youth could still run afoul of the
Constitution.220
Given that mitigating evidence can only be
considered under a discretionary sentencing statute, the Court clearly
did not limit its holding only to mandatory sentences. Additionally,
the Court says that Miller is not a procedural decision, meaning the
holding is not simply that sentencing courts must allow for
discretion.221
Further evidence that the Supreme Court intended Montgomery to
apply to discretionary sentences comes from the series of Arizona
cases that were vacated and remanded.222 In these cases, the minor
defendants were sentenced under a discretionary sentencing
statute.223 The Supreme Court, in deciding to remand these cases for
reconsideration in light of Montgomery, made clear its belief that
Montgomery applies even to discretionary sentences.224
Thus, to comply with Montgomery, a state must apply
Montgomery’s mandates to all juvenile defendants facing life without
parole sentences, not just those sentenced under a mandatory statute.
D. Montgomery Applies to Lengthy Sentences that Are the
Equivalent to Life Without Parole

Miller and Montgomery placed constitutional limits on the type of

sentences that are allowable for children. The Court reasoned that
the decreased culpability of children means that incredibly few
217. See id. at 734.
218. See Jones v. Commonwealth, 795 S.E.2d 705, 711 (Va. 2017); see also supra
Section II.B.
219. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 733–35.
220. Id. at 734 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 543 (2005)) (“Even if a
court considers a child’s age before sentencing him or her to a lifetime in prison, that
sentence still violates the Eighth Amendment for a child whose crime reflects
‘unfortunate yet transient immaturity.’”).
221. See id.
222. See Tatum v. Arizona, 137 S. Ct. 11, 11 (2016).
223. See id. at 12.
224. See id.
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deserve to spend their lives in prison, with no opportunity to
demonstrate redemption.225 The Court’s judgment that children
should not spend their entire lives incarcerated unless they are truly
incorrigible applies whenever a child faces a lifetime behind bars,
regardless of whether the sentence is technically labeled “life without
parole.” It would violate the principles of Miller and Montgomery to
hold that a youthful offender may be sentenced to a lifetime of
incarceration without the procedural and substantive protections
required by the Court, simply because the sentence is different in
name only.226 An offender who is sentenced to a lengthy term of
years should not be worse off than an offender who was sentenced to
life without parole.
Miller’s protections should not only be activated when the term of
years exceeds the predicted life span of the offender, such as a
sentence of 200 years. In Graham, the Supreme Court held that
children convicted of nonhomicide offenses cannot be sentenced to
life without parole and that they must instead have a “realistic” and
“meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated
maturity and rehabilitation.”227 Graham thus established that youth
who are ineligible for life without parole must have a “meaningful
opportunity” for release.228 Therefore, juvenile homicide offenders
who may not be sentenced to life imprisonment must too have such a
chance. Thus, the possibility of geriatric release, when the youth has
spent over half a century behind bars, cannot be considered a
meaningful opportunity. Attempts to circumvent Miller’s holding
through lengthy sentences should be overturned.
E.

States Should Narrow the Juvenile Offenses Eligible for Life
Without Parole

In Miller and Montgomery, the Court analogized the sentence of
life without parole for minors to the sentence of death for adults.229
The Supreme Court repeatedly cited landmark Eighth Amendment
death penalty cases, suggesting that the Court’s death penalty cases

225. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 733.
226. See supra notes 161–165 and accompanying text for state court decisions that
agree with this position.
227. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75, 82 (2010).
228. Id. at 75.
229. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 475 (2012) (“[W]e viewed [life without
the possibility of parole] for juveniles as akin to the death penalty, we treated it
similarly to that most severe punishment.”).
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are highly relevant for the discussion of juvenile life without parole.230
The fundamental holding of much of the death penalty jurisprudence
is that the sentence must be reserved for the “worst of the worst”
offenders.231 Much like death is reserved for the worst adult homicide
offenders, life without parole is reserved for the worst juvenile
homicide offenders.232 Given that both punishments are reserved for
the most culpable, it would stand to reason that states would make
the offenses for which adults can receive the death penalty the same
as the offenses for which juveniles can receive life without parole.
However, as outlined above, not all states have unified such
offenses.233
Additionally, in death penalty law, the Supreme Court requires
state death penalty statutes to “narrow[ ] the categories of murders
for which a death sentence may ever be imposed.”234 Although not
binding precedent for juvenile cases, as it applies only in the death
penalty context, the death penalty narrowing requirement gives clear
guidance on what states should require in order to differentiate the
“rare” juvenile offender who represents the worst of the worst. In
addition to only making juveniles convicted of first-degree or capital
murder eligible for life without parole, there should be some means to
further identify the rare juvenile whose crime reflects irreparable
corruption. Although it is questionable how well aggravating
circumstances actually constrain eligibility,235 it is one way to ensure
there is at least some narrowing of individuals eligible for the worst
punishments.

230. See supra Section I.B.
231. See Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 206 (2006) (stating the death penalty must
be reserved for the “worst of the worst”); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
568 (2005) (stating that capital punishment must be limited to offenders whose
culpability makes them “the most deserving of execution”).
232. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 733 (2016); see also supra
Sections I.B., I.C.
233. See supra Part II.
234. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 270 (1976).
235. See Chelsea Creo Sharon, The “Most Deserving” of Death: The Narrowing

Requirement and the Proliferation of Aggravating Factors in Capital Sentencing
Statutes, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 223, 224 (2011).
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IV. MONTGOMERY CONTAINS THE SEEDS FOR THE END OF
JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE
A. Montgomery’s Deficiencies

1.

It Is Scientifically Impossible to Reliably Identify Irreparably
Corrupt Juveniles

Montgomery’s holding that life without parole is only justified for
the irreparably corrupt offender is complicated by one significant
factor: it is impossible to tell with any certainty which juveniles fall
into this category. The Court in Graham acknowledged this fact,
stating that, “juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified
among the worst offenders.”236 This is because the science of
adolescent brain development,237 on which the Court based its
conclusion that “children are different,” plainly states that making an
accurate determination about a juvenile’s permanent character is
impossible.238
The American Psychological Association (“APA”), in an amicus
brief filed in Miller, stated that, “there is no reliable way to determine
that a juvenile’s offenses are the result of an irredeemably corrupt
character.”239 The APA noted that early predictors for adult
psychopathy are strongly lacking. For example, “[o]ne study found
that only 16 percent of young adolescents who scored in the top
quintile of a juvenile psychopathy measure would eventually be
assessed as psychopathic at age 24.”240 Another study showed “no
correlation between a youthful homicide offense and the basic
psychological measures of persistent antisocial personality.”241
Similarly, the article “Guilty by Reason of Adolescence,” which is
cited five times by the Court in Roper, explains that science
“currently lack(s) the diagnostic tools to evaluate psychosocial
immaturity reliably on an individualized basis or to distinguish young
career criminals from ordinary adolescents who will repudiate their

236. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569).
237. See supra Section I.A.; see also supra Section III.B.
238. Brief for Am. Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 24–25, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647).
239. Id. at 25.
240. Id. at 21.
241. Id. at 22.
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reckless experimentation as adults.”242 The article further explained
that permanent labels regarding a youth’s ability to change are
“difficult to defend as applied to individuals whose identity
development is still under way.”243 Furthermore, any attempts to
litigate the question of “maturity on a case-by-case basis is likely to be
an error-prone undertaking.”244
Scientists make clear that any determination about a juvenile’s
permanent character is completely inconsistent with the science on
which Miller rests. As the Iowa Supreme Court rightly observed,
Montgomery’s directive to sentencing courts to separate the
incorrigible from the immature asks courts to “do the impossible,
namely, to determine whether the offender is ‘irretrievably corrupt’ at
a time when even trained professionals with years of clinical
experience would not attempt to make such a determination.”245

2.

Sentences Will Be Arbitrary

Neither Miller nor Montgomery defines what evidence would
support a finding of irreparable corruption nor does either decision
provide guidelines for identifying the exceptionally rare juvenile who
is eligible for life without parole. The Court made clear that the
heinousness of the crime cannot by itself be offered as evidence of an
irreparably corrupt youth, because even youth who commit horrific
crimes “are capable of change.”246 The crime for which the juvenile is
being sentenced is likely the worst thing that he or she has done in
life.
If a brutal murder is not enough to declare a youth
“irreparable,” what is?
The Court fails to provide an answer to this question. Miller
mandates a procedural hearing where the court considers the several
factors, known as the “Miller factors,” in order to distinguish the
irreparable from the transiently immature.247 But without instruction
on how to interpret such factors, courts are unable to apply them
consistently in any fair way. For example, Miller requires sentencing
courts to consider evidence of the offender’s “family and home

242. Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of
Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the
Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOL. 1009, 1016 (2003).
243. Id. at 1015.
244. Id. at 1016 (emphasis added).
245. State v. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 811, 837 (Iowa 2016).
246. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct 718, 733–36 (2016).
247. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477–78 (2012).
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environment.”248 However, it is undecided what type of family
environment supports a finding that a juvenile acted as a result of
transient immaturity. In one Miller sentencing hearing conducted in
Iowa, the sentencing court cited the fact that the juvenile offender
had “no family or other support outside of the criminal community”
as one of the factors warranting a life without parole sentence.249 Yet,
in another sentencing proceeding conducted in California, the court
specifically held that the defendant’s family was “not a mitigating
factor” because he was “raised in a supportive and financially stable
family.”250 Both evidence of significant familial support and evidence
of a lack of familial support have been used to support an increased
sentence. This highlights the key problem with the Miller factors:
they fail to provide clear guidance, and, without guidance, a judge can
construe any facts to support a sentence of life without parole.
Judges have differing views about what is mitigating and what is
aggravating and how to weigh such evidence.251
Therefore,
sentencing decisions will necessarily be inconsistent across courts,
resulting in arbitrary and unpredictable punishments. Such a
subjective sentencing procedure will surely not enable a judge to
reliably identify the rare incorrigible defender.

3.

Increased Racial Disparities

The inconsistent imposition of juvenile life without parole will
inevitably have a significant discriminatory impact on juveniles of
color, especially African American youth. Studies conducted prior to
the Court’s decision in Miller highlight the disproportionate rate at
which African American juveniles are sentenced to life without

248. Id. at 477.
249. State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 552 (Iowa 2015).
250. People v. Jordan, 185 Cal. Rptr. 3d 174, 182 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015), vacated and
reh’g granted, 381 P.3d 220 (Cal. 2016); see also Casiano v. Comm’r of Corr., 115
A.3d 1031, 1061 (Conn. 2015) (citing the fact that the defendant had a “caring, stable
family” as evidence in aggravation, making the defendant more morally culpable for
his actions).
251. For example, the fact that a murder was not premeditated led 11.8% of jurors
to be “much less” likely to vote for the death penalty, while 15.8% of jurors viewed
that same fact as making them “much more” likely to vote for death. See generally
Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors
Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1569 (1998) (emphasis added) (outlining research
showing the different ways jurors view the same evidence). Although this is a study
of jurors, not judges, the article demonstrates that different individuals view different
evidence as mitigating and aggravating. See generally id.; Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge
Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2010)
(documenting the sentencing disparities between judges).
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parole. A 2012 study showed that 60% of juveniles sentenced to life
without parole were African American,252 despite only representing
about 13% of the United States population.253 A 2005 study showed
African American juveniles are sentenced to life without parole at a
rate ten times higher than that of white juvenile offenders.254
Additionally, the race of the victim is a significant factor in sentencing
juveniles to life without parole.
Although African American
juveniles accused of killing a white victim make up only 23.2% of
juvenile homicide arrests, they comprise 43.4% of juveniles sentenced
to life without parole.255 Conversely, white offenders accused of
killing African American victims make up 6.4% of juvenile homicide
arrests, but only 3.6% of juveniles sentenced to life without parole.256
The extremely divergent rate at which juveniles of color receive life
without parole sentences reflects widespread racial discrimination in
both the charging and sentencing of juvenile homicide offenders.
What is more, these studies pre-date Miller, when twenty-eight states
had at least one mandatory juvenile life without parole sentencing
scheme.257 The added discretion that stems from Miller and
Montgomery will likely make the disparate racial impact even starker.
A number of studies have demonstrated that implicit bias affects the
behavior of those in the justice system, including trial judges.258
Notably, studies have shown that “implicit biases based on racial
stereotypes conflate assessments of youth culpability, maturity,
sophistication, future dangerousness, and severity of punishment.”259
The very task that trial courts are required to undertake—accurately

252. ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE LIVES OF JUVENILE LIFERS:
FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY 8 (2012), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/The-Lives-of-Juvenile-Lifers.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JHW-H3
XZ].
253. QuickFacts: Population Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 1, 2016),
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045216/00 [https://perma.cc/888L-V8F6].
254. ALISON PARKER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AMNESTY INT’L, THE REST OF
THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES
39 (2005), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/TheRestofTheirLives.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WHP7-NKMP].
255. NELLIS, supra note 252, at 3.
256. Id.
257. JOSH ROVNER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, SLOW TO ACT: STATE RESPONSES
TO 2012 SUPREME COURT MANDATE ON LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE 1 (2014),
http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Slow-to-Act-StateResponses-to-Miller.pdf [https://perma.cc/EN48-YFVX].
258. Robin Walker Sterling, “Children Are Different”: Implicit Bias,
Rehabilitation, and the “New” Juvenile Jurisprudence, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1019,
1066–67 (2013).
259. Id. at 1067.
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assessing maturity, culpability and future dangerousness—is
complicated by implicit bias concerning the mitigating nature of youth
in African American children.260
Unfortunately, racially biased sentencing on its own will not likely
provide sufficient reasoning for the Supreme Court to end juvenile
life without parole.261 However, such disparate sentencing does
support a finding that the punishment is being dispensed arbitrarily
rather than reserved for the rare incorrigible offender. Furthermore,
state courts should consider the discriminatory impact of juvenile life
without parole when considering challenges to the constitutionality
and acceptability of the practice.
B.

A Categorical Ban on Life Without Parole for Juvenile
Offenders Is the Only Constitutional Option

Under the current case-by-case approach, sentencers are required
to make speculative decisions on prospects for rehabilitation, without
sufficient predictive information to support such a conclusion. The
failure of both science and sentencing factors to reliably separate
irreparable offenders from those whose crimes reflect transient
immaturity creates an unjustifiably high risk that courts are issuing
unconstitutional sentences. This risk illustrates the need for a
categorical ban.
The Court in Graham considered taking a case-by-case approach
by creating a rule that would require courts to take a juvenile
offender’s age into consideration at sentencing, much like what the
Miller Court did.262 However, the Court found such an approach
insufficient to provide adequate constitutional protections.263 The
Court proceeded to cite five reasons why a categorical ban on juvenile
life without parole for nonhomicide offenders was necessary.264 Each
260. Id. at 1068. See generally Kenneth B. Nunn, The Child as Other: Race and
Differential Treatment in the Juvenile Justice System, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 679
(2002).
261. However, note that in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), the United
States Supreme Court held that the racially disproportionate impact of the death
penalty in Georgia was not enough to violate the constitution, without a showing that
the Georgia death penalty statute had a racially discriminatory purpose. Thus, unless
the Supreme Court wants to overturn McCleskey, the racially discriminatory impact
of life without parole sentences on juveniles will not alone be sufficient for the
Supreme Court to create a categorical ban on juvenile life without parole sentences.
262. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 76 (2010).
263. Id. at 78.
264. Id. at 77–79 (confining the case-by-case sentencing approach because:
(1) cannot identify the incorrigible offenders; (2) high risk of erroneous sentencing;
(3) differences too large to allow for such a risk; (4) juveniles have impaired criminal
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of the five reasons cited applies with equal force to life without parole
for homicide offenders. Thus, the Court’s reasoning in Graham
actually illustrates why its current approach in Miller and
Montgomery is unsatisfactory.
First, the Graham court explained that a categorical approach was
necessary because it is impossible to identify the rare incorrigible
offender.265 The Court explained that even if the court believes a
juvenile may exhibit sufficient depravity, “it does not follow that
courts taking a case-by-case proportionality approach could with
sufficient accuracy distinguish the few incorrigible juvenile offenders
from the many that have the capacity for change.”266 The Court
directly questioned a sentencer’s ability to perform the very task it
mandates in Montgomery.
Next, the Court held that an “unacceptable likelihood exists that
the brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would
overpower mitigating arguments based on youth.”267 This would
likely result in juveniles receiving sentences of life without parole,
despite the fact that their “immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true
depravity” require a lesser sentence.268 The Court determined this
risk of error unacceptable, and further evidence of the need for a
categorical ban. As homicide cases are typically more brutal and
cold-blooded than nonhomicide cases, it stands to reason that the
same risk of error exists with equal or greater force in homicide cases.
The Court then explained that “‘[t]he differences between juvenile
and adult offenders are too marked and well understood to risk
allowing a youthful person to receive’ a sentence of life without
parole for a nonhomicide crime ‘despite insufficient culpability.’”269
Similarly, the Court in Montgomery noted that the vast majority of
juvenile homicide offenders also have insufficient culpability, and that
the differences between juveniles and adults are not crime specific.270
The fourth problem with a case-by-case approach is its failure to
consider the “special difficulties encountered by counsel in juvenile
representation,”271 including the fact that juveniles are at “a

representation; and (5) juveniles should have a chance to demonstrate maturity and
reform).
265. Id. at 77.
266. Id. (emphasis added).
267. Id. at 78.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 78 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572–73 (2005)).
270. Montgomery v. Lousiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 733 (2016).
271. Graham, 560 U.S. at 78.
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significant disadvantage in criminal proceedings.”272 The Court then
concluded that, “[a] categorical rule avoids the risk that, as a result of
these difficulties, a court or jury will erroneously conclude that a
particular juvenile is sufficiently culpable to deserve life without
parole.”273 Lastly, the Court noted that a categorical approach
prohibiting life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders
was the only way to ensure that juveniles are given the opportunity to
mature and demonstrate reform.274 Neither of these last two factors
are crime specific. Undoubtedly, every factor that led the court to
deem a categorical ban necessary in nonhomicide cases equally
applies to the sentencing of juvenile homicide offenders to life
without parole.
Based on the these factors, the Graham Court ultimately concluded
that laws “allowing the imposition of these sentences based only on a
discretionary, subjective judgment by a judge or jury that the offender
is irredeemably depraved, are insufficient to prevent the possibility
that the offender will receive a life without parole sentence for which
he or she lacks the moral culpability.”275
Miller, as interpreted by Montgomery, established such a
subjective sentencing scheme, requiring a sentencer to make a
discretionary judgment that a juvenile is incorrigible. However,
Graham already concluded that such subjective determinations, even
when made after full consideration of youth, are insufficient to shield
against the high risk of unconstitutional sentencing.276 A categorical
ban is the only way to adequately protect the rights of the vast
majority juvenile offenders.
CONCLUSION

Montgomery held that only juveniles who are irreparably corrupt
may be sentenced to life without parole.277 Without reliable guidance
as to how to distinguish an “irreparably corrupt” juvenile from the
typical juvenile offender who is capable of rehabilitation, life without
parole sentences necessarily will be imposed in an unconstitutional
manner.278 Such reliable guidance is likely impossible, due to the

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Id.
Id. at 78–79.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 77 (emphasis added).
Id.
See supra Section I.C.
See supra Part IV.
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inherently transient nature of the juvenile brain.279 A future parole
board, with the added knowledge that only comes with time, will be in
a better position to determine whether or not a juvenile can be
rehabilitated.
Based on the conflicting interpretations of Montgomery at the state
level, the Supreme Court will soon have an opportunity to clarify the
holdings of Miller and Montgomery.280 It is possible that the Court
could continue to adopt a case-by-case approach and merely provide
some clarification on the holdings in Montgomery. However, if the
Court genuinely believes that it is unconstitutional to sentence a
juvenile whose crime reflects transient immaturity to life without
possibility of parole, the only option for the Court is to issue a
categorical ban.281

279. See supra Section IV.A.
280. See supra Part II.
281. See supra Section IV.B.
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APPENDIX A. STATES THAT ALLOW LWOP FOR JUVENILE
OFFENDERS
Which states allow juvenile LWOP sentences and which have outlawed the
practice?1
States that permit sentencing juveniles to
LWOP
States that currently
have juvenile
offenders serving
LWOP sentences

Alabama, Arizona,
Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Louisiana,
Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota,
Mississippi,
Montana, Nebraska,
New Hampshire,
North Carolina,
Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Tennessee,
Virginia,
Washington, and
Wisconsin
1

States that do not
have any juvenile
offenders currently
serving LWOP
sentences

Maine, Missouri,
New Mexico, New
York, and Rhode
Island

States that have eliminated LWOP
sentences for juvenile offenders
States where all
juvenile offenders
have an opportunity
for parole

States that did not
make the
elimination of
LWOP for juveniles
retroactive and still
have juvenile
offenders serving
LWOP sentences

Alaska, Arkansas,
California,
Connecticut,
Delaware, District of
Columbia, Hawaii,
Iowa, Kansas,
Massachusetts,
Nevada, New Jersey,
North Dakota, South
Dakota, Vermont,
West Virginia, and
Wyoming

Colorado, Kentucky,
Texas, and Utah

See U.S. NEWS, A STATE-BY-STATE LOOK AT JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE (2017),
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/utah/articles/2017-07-31/a-state-by-state-look-at-juvenile-lifewithout-parole [https://perma.cc/XK76-WAEX].
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APPENDIX B. IRREPARABLE CORRUPTION DETERMINATION
Must a sentencing court find a juvenile to be “irreparably corrupt” prior to
imposing a life without parole sentence?
Court
Arizona Supreme Court

Yes, there must be an explicit finding
Decision
Quote(s)
State v. Valencia, 386 P.3d

“Arizona law, when Healer and Valencia

392, 395 (Ariz. 2016)

were sentenced, allowed a trial court to
impose a natural life sentence on a juvenile
convicted of first degree murder without

distinguishing crimes that reflected
‘irreparable corruption’ rather than the
‘transient immaturity of youth.’” (emphasis
added)

Florida Supreme Court

Landrum v. State, 192

“Without this individualized sentencing

So.3d 459, 467–468 (Fla.

consideration, a sentencer is unable to

2016)

distinguish

between

juvenile

offenders

whose crimes ‘reflect transient immaturity’
and those whose crimes reflect ‘irreparable
corruption.’ Failing to make this distinction,
otherwise, would mean life sentences for
juveniles would not be exceedingly rare, but
possibly commonplace.” (emphasis added)
“[The court] did not consider whether the
crime itself reflected ‘transient immaturity’
rather than ‘irreparable corruption.’”

Georgia Supreme Court

Veal v. State, 784 S.E.2d

“The trial court did not, however, make any

403, 411 (Ga. 2016)

sort of distinct determination on the record
that Appellant is irreparably corrupt or

permanently incorrigible, as necessary to
put him in the narrow class of juvenile
murderers for whom an LWOP sentence is
proportional.” (emphasis added)

Oklahoma Criminal
Appeals Court

Luna v. State, 387 P.3d

“For the reasons we have discussed, Luna’s

956, 963 (Okla. Crim. App.

sentence of life without parole must be

(highest court in

2016)

vacated and the matter remanded for

Oklahoma for criminal

resentencing to determine whether the

appeals)

crime reflects Luna's transient immaturity,
or an irreparable corruption and permanent
incorrigibility
sanction

of

warranting
life

the

imprisonment

parole.” (emphasis added)

extreme
without
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Pennsylvania Supreme
Court

191

Commonwealth v. Batts,

“If, after a hearing and consideration of all

163 A.3d 410, 108–09 (Pa.

of the evidence presented, the sentencing

2017)

court finds that the Commonwealth has
satisfied its burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the juvenile is so

permanently incorrigible that rehabilitation
of the offender would be impossible, the bar
against sentencing a juvenile offender to life
without the possibility of parole is lifted.”
(emphasis added)

Iowa Supreme Court

State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d

“The sentencing judge should only sentence

*The Iowa Supreme Court

545, 556 (Iowa 2015)

those juveniles to life in prison without the

required a finding of

possibility of parole whose crime reflects

irreparable corruption

irreparable corruption.”

post-Miller but prior to

State v. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d

“We noted that if a life sentence without

Montgomery.

811, 833 (Iowa 2016)

parole could ever be imposed on a juvenile

(interpreting Seats)

offender, the burden was on the state to

show that an individual offender manifested
‘irreparable corruption.’” (emphasis added)

California Court of
Appeals
*Courts of Appeals are
split on this issue (see
below for courts holding
that a determination of
irreparable corruption is
not required).
**In October of 2017, a
law was passed that
effectively ended juvenile
life without parole in the
state. It is unclear whether
the California Supreme
Court will hear arguments
and resolve the split with
Padilla or consider the
issue moot.

Appellate Court of
Illinois
*Appellate Courts are split
on the issue (see below for
courts holding that a
determination of
irreparable corruption is
not required).
**The Illinois Supreme
Court recently granted

Expressly held that
determination is required:
People v. Padilla, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 209, 220–21 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2016), appeal
docketed, 387 P.3d 741
(Cal. 2017) (requesting
briefing on whether a trial
court is required to make
an irreparable corruption
determination before
imposing LWOP)

“In view of Montgomery, the trial court
must assess the Miller factors with an eye to
making an express determination whether
the

juvenile

permanent

offender’s

incorrigibility

crime

reflects

arising

from

irreparable corruption.” (Padilla at 673)
(emphasis added)

Implied that determination
is required:
In re Berg, 202 Cal. Rptr.
3d 786 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016)

People v. Nieto, 52 N.E.3d

“The trial court’s findings do not imply that

442, 455 (Ill. App. Ct.

it believed defendant was the rarest of

2016)

juveniles whose crime showed that he was
permanently incorrigible.” (emphasis
added)
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review on the issue. See
People v. Holman, 60
N.E.3d 878 (Ill. 2016).

Court of Appeals of
Michigan

People v. Hyatt, 891

“The United States Supreme Court has

N.W.2d 549, 552 (Mich. Ct.

made unmistakably clear, it is only the truly

App. 2016)

rare juvenile who will be deserving of the
harshest penalty available under the laws of
this state, and a life-without-parole sentence
is an

unconstitutional penalty for all

juveniles but those whose crimes reflect
irreparable corruption. For this reason,
while we conclude that a judge, not a jury, is
to make this determination.”

No, a sentencing court is not required to find a juvenile “irreparably corrupt” prior to
imposing an LWOP sentence
Court
Decision
Quote(s)
Virginia Supreme Court

Jones v. Commonwealth,

Holding that Miller merely requires that a

795 S.E.2d 705 (Va. 2017)

defendant have an opportunity to present
mitigation, and that judges do not in fact
have to consider it.

Washington Supreme
Court

State v. Ramos, 387 P.3d

“It also does not require the sentencing

650, 659 (Wash. 2017)

court . . . to make an explicit finding that the
offense reflects irreparable corruption on
the part of the juvenile.”

Tennessee Court of
Appeals

Brown v. State, No.

“As indicated, the Court reiterated that

W2015-00887-CCA-R3-

‘Miller did not require trial courts to make a

PC, 2016 WL 1562981, at

finding

*7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr.

incorrigibility’ but only required ‘[a] hearing

of

fact

regarding

a

child’s

15, 2016), appeal denied

where

(Aug. 19, 2016), cert.

characteristics’ are considered as sentencing

denied, 137 S. Ct. 1331

factors . . . to separate those juveniles who

(2017)

may be sentenced to life without parole

‘youth

and

its

attendant

from those who may not.’”

California Court of
Appeals

People v. Blackwell, 207

“Once such a juvenile offender has been

Cal. Rptr. 3d 444, 462

convicted of first degree murder and one or

*Courts of Appeals are
split on this issue (see
above for courts holding
that a determination of
irreparable corruption is
required).
**In October of 2017, a
law was passed that
effectively ended juvenile
life without parole in the

(2016)

more special circumstances has been found
true beyond a reasonable doubt, the

People v. Willover, 203

sentencing

Cal. Rptr. 3d 384 (2016)

particular

court
fact

need

not

before

find

any

imposing

LWOP . . . As the People put it, ‘irreparable
corruption’ is not a factual finding, but
merely ‘encapsulates the [absence] of youthbased mitigation.’” (Blackwell, 462)
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state. It is unclear whether
the California Supreme
Court will hear arguments
and resolve the split with
Padilla or consider the
issue moot.

Appellate Court of
Illinois

People v. Stafford, 61

“Although the trial court did not explicitly

N.E.3d 1058, 1068–69 (Ill.

state defendant was one of the rarest of

*Appellate Courts are split
on the issue (see above for
the Illinois court’s holding
that a determination of
irreparable corruption is
required).
**The Illinois Supreme
Court recently granted
review on the issue. See
People v. Holman, 60
N.E.3d 878 (Ill. 2016).

Ct. App, 2016)

juvenile offenders whose crime showed a
life sentence is appropriate, the court’s

People v. Holman, 58
N.E.3d 632, appeal
docketed, 60 N.E.3d 878
(Ill. 2016)

reasoning

certainly

conveys

the

same

conclusion.” (Stafford, 1068–69) (emphasis
added)
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APPENDIX C. DISCRETIONARY VS. MANDATORY SENTENCES
Do Miller and Montgomery apply to discretionary LWOP sentences, or just
to mandatory LWOP sentences?
Miller and Montgomery apply to
Miller and Montgomery apply ONLY to
discretionary LWOP sentences
mandatory LWOP sentences
State Supreme Court Decisions B
Arizona Supreme Court

Arkansas Supreme Court

State v. Valencia, 386 P.3d 392 (Ariz. 2016)
California Supreme Court

*

People v. Gutierrez, 324 P.3d 245(Cal. 2014)
Connecticut Supreme Court

*C

State v. Riley, 315 Conn. 637 (2015)

*A

Brown v. Hobbs, 2014 Ark. 267 (2014)
Indiana Supreme Court

*A

Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864 (Ind. 2012)
Minnesota Supreme Court

*C

State v. Williams, 862 N.W.2d 701 (Minn.
2015)

Florida Supreme Court

Missouri Supreme Court

Atwell v. State, 197 So.3d 1040 (Fla. 2016)

C

Georgia Supreme Court

South Dakota Supreme Court

Dennis v. State, 300 Ga. 457 (2017)
Iowa Supreme Court

State v. Nathan, 522 S.W.3d 881 (Mo. 2017)

*

State v. Charles, 892 N.W.2d 915 (S.D. 2017)
Virginia Supreme Court

State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545 (Iowa 2015)

Jones v. Commonwealth, 795 S.E.2d 705
(Va. 2017)

Montana Supreme Court*

Nevada Supreme Court

Beach v. State, 379 Mont. 74, 86 (2015)

*A

Randell v. State, No. 61232, 2013 WL
7158872 (Nev. Dec. 12, 2013)

New Jersey Supreme Court

C

State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422 (2017)

West Virginia Supreme Court

*A

State v. Redman, No. 13-0225, 2014 WL
1272553 (W.Va. Mar. 28, 2014)

Oklahoma Criminal Appeals Court

Luna v. State, 387 P.3d. 956 (Okla. Crim.
App. 2016)
Ohio Supreme Court*

State v. Long, 138 Ohio.St.3d 478 (2014)
South Carolina Supreme Court*

Aiken v. Byars, 410 S.C. 534 (2014)
Washington Supreme Court

State v. Ramos, 387 P.3d 650 (Wash. 2017)
* Case decided before Montgomery v. Louisiana.
A

Following this decision, this state eliminated LWOP as a possible punishment for juvenile offenders.
Kentucky does not permit juvenile LWOP sentences, but it has not made the elimination retroactive.
C
Court interpreting Miller and Montgomery’s mandates with “de facto” or “effective” LWOP sentences.
B
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APPENDIX D. DE FACTO LWOP SENTENCES
Do Miller (and Graham) apply to lengthy “de facto” LWOP sentences?
State Supreme Court cases holding that a lengthy sentence is a de facto life
sentence
Miller applies to de facto LWOP sentences
Court

Quote/Holding

California Supreme Court

“We now hold that just as Graham applies to sentences that are

People v. Franklin, 370 P.3d

the ‘functional equivalent of life without parole sentence,’ so too

1053, 1059 (Cal. 2016)
Connecticut Supreme Court

Casiano v. Comm’r of Corr., 115
A.3d 1031, 1048 (Conn. 2015)

does Miller apply to such functionally equivalent sentences.”
“We are nonetheless persuaded that the procedures set forth in

Miller must be followed when considering whether to sentence a
juvenile offender to fifty years imprisonment without parole.”

Illinois Supreme Court

“[T]he sentencing scheme mandated that he remain in prison

People v. Reyes, 63 N.E.3d 884,

until at least the age of 105 . . . [u]nquestionably, then, under the

888 (Ill. 2016)

circumstances,

defendant’s

term-of-years

sentence

is

a

mandatory, de facto life-without-parole sentence. We therefore
vacate defendant’s sentence as unconstitutional pursuant to

Miller.”

Indiana Supreme Court

Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 8

“Similar to a life without parole sentence, Brown's 150 year
sentence ‘forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal.’”

(Ind. 2014)
Iowa Supreme Court

“A threshold question is whether a 52.5–year minimum prison

State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 71

term for a juvenile based on the aggregation of mandatory

(Iowa 2013)

minimum sentences for second-degree murder and first-degree
robbery triggers the protections to be afforded under Miller—
namely, an individualized sentencing hearing to determine the
issue of parole eligibility. We think it does.”

New Jersey Supreme Court

“The term-of-years sentences in these appeals—a minimum of 55

State v. Zuber, 152 A.3d 197,

years’ imprisonment for Zuber and 68 years and 3 months for

212–13 (N.J. 2017)

Comer—are not officially ‘life without parole.’ But we find that
the lengthy term-of-years sentences imposed on the juveniles in
these cases are sufficient to trigger the protections of Miller
under the Federal and State Constitutions.”

Washington Supreme Court

State v. Ramos, 387 P.3d 650,
659 (2017)
Wyoming Supreme Court

Bear Cloud v. State, 334 P.3d
132, 144 (Wyo. 2014)

“Miller applies equally to literal and de facto life-without-parole
sentences[,]” and “it is undisputed that Ramos’ 85-year aggregate
sentence is a de facto life sentence.”
Aggregate sentence of just over 45 years was de facto equivalent
of life sentence without parole.
“The United States Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence requires that a process be followed before we
make the judgment that juvenile ‘offenders never will be fit to
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That process must be applied to the entire

sentencing package, when the sentence is life without parole, or
when aggregate sentences result in the functional equivalent of
life without parole.”

Using similar reasoning, cases that held Graham applicable to de facto LWOP
sentences
Florida Supreme Court

“Because Henry’s aggregate sentence, which totals ninety years

Henry v. State, 175 So. 3d 675,

and requires him to be imprisoned until he is at least nearly

679–80 (Fla. 2016)

ninety-five years old, does not afford him this opportunity [of
release], that sentence is unconstitutional under Graham.”

Louisiana Supreme Court*

State ex rel. Morgan v. State,

“Defendant’s 99-year sentence [without parole] [w]as an effective
life sentence, illegal under Graham.”

217 So. 3d 266, 271 (La. 2016)
*The Louisiana Supreme Court held
that a lengthy sentence for ONE
crime can be a de facto life sentence,
but that lengthy aggregate sentences
do not violate Graham (see below).

Nevada Supreme Court

“Boston’s aggregate sentences [for nonhomicide crimes], which

State v. Boston, 383 P.3d 453,

require him to serve approximately 100 years before being

458 (Nev. 2015)

eligible for parole, are without a doubt the functional equivalent
of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole.”

Ohio Supreme Court

“We see no significant difference between a sentence of life

State v. Moore, 76 N.E.3d 1127,

imprisonment without parole and a term-of-years prison sentence

¶ 59, at 1139 (Ohio 2016)

that would extend beyond the defendant’s expected lifespan
before the possibility of parole.”

State Supreme Court cases holding that a lengthy sentence is not a de facto
LWOP sentence
Miller and/or Graham do not apply to lengthy aggregate sentences
Louisiana Supreme Court

“In our view, Graham does not prohibit consecutive term of year

State v. Brown, 118 So. 3d 332,

sentences for multiple offenses committed while a defendant was

341 (La. 2013)

under the age of 18, even if they might exceed a defendant’s
lifetime.”

Georgia Supreme Court

“Clearly, ‘[n]othing in the Court’s opinion [Graham] affects the

Adams v. State, 707 S.E.2d 359,

imposition of a sentence to a term of years without the possibility

365 (Ga. 2011)

of parole.’”

Nebraska Supreme Court*

“We conclude that Garza’s characterization of his sentence as a

State v. Garza, 888 N.W.2d 526,

de facto life sentence is immaterial to our analysis of whether his

535–36 (2016)
*In another case the Nebraska
Supreme Court in analyzing a
lengthy sentence under Graham

sentence is excessive.”
“Both Miller and Tatum dealt with juvenile defendants who had
been sentenced, or resentenced, to life imprisonment without
parole for murder. Garza, in contrast, was resentenced to a term
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implied that a lengthy sentence
could equate to life without parole.
State v. Smith, 295 Neb. 957 (2017).

of years and is eligible for parole . . . [therefore] we find no merit
to his argument that the sentencing court was required by Miller
or Tatum to make a specific finding of ‘irreparable corruption.’”

Virginia Supreme Court

“[Defendants] argue only that we should expand Graham’s

Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 781

prohibition of life-without-parole sentences to non-life sentences

S.E.2d 920, 925 (Va. 2016)

that, when aggregated, exceed the normal life spans of juvenile
offenders. For several reasons, we decline the invitation to do
so.”

Although Miller or Graham might apply to some lengthy sentences, the court found
that the specific length at issue was not a de facto LWOP sentence
Delaware Supreme Court

“Although it may be that the imposition of a specific sentence of

Walker v. State, No. 430, 2016,

years to a minor in a specific case could be deemed the

2017 WL 443724, at *1 (Del. Jan.
17, 2017)

equivalent of a life sentence that the Supreme Court could not
logically distinguish from its holding in the trilogy of cases noted
earlier, this is not such case. At the time of his heinous crime,
Walker was just shy of the age of majority. Life expectancy in
the United States is now 78.8 years, which is over a decade
beyond when Walker would be eligible for release.”

Nebraska Supreme Court*

“Here, the presentence report supports that the average life

State v. Smith, 892 N.W.2d 52,

expectancy for someone Smith’s age is 78.8 years, and as

64 (Neb. 2017)

discussed above, Smith is eligible for release at 62 years of age.

*Nebraska’s caselaw interpreting de
facto life sentences in homicide cases
is confusing—it is unclear if the
court finds Miller applicable. See
State v. Garza, 888 N.W.2d 526
(Neb. 2016).

Accordingly, Smith’s sentence of 90 years to life imprisonment
allows for parole eligibility almost 17 years before his average life
expectancy.”

South Dakota Supreme Court

“A life sentence is commonly understood to mean spending the

State v. Charles, 892 N.W.2d

rest of one’s life in prison. This is not to say that a sentence to a

915, ¶ 16, at 921 (S.D. 2017)

term of years for a juvenile homicide offender will always pass
constitutional muster.

For example, ‘term sentences virtually

guaranteeing an offender will die in prison without meaningful
opportunity for release could be considered a life sentence for
the purpose of applying Graham or Miller.’ Because Charles has
the opportunity for release at age 60, his sentence does not
‘guarantee[ ] he will die in prison without any meaningful
opportunity to obtain release.’” (internal citations omitted)

Virginia Supreme Court

“The possibility of geriatric release under Code § 53.1-40.01

Johnson v. Commonwealth, 793

provides a meaningful opportunity for release that is akin to

S.E.2d 326, 331 (Va. 2016)

parole.”
Because of the possibility of geriatric release, no term of years,
no matter how lengthy, is a “de facto” life sentence.
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APPENDIX E. PRESUMPTION AGAINST LWOP
Is there a presumption against LWOP and/or is the burden on the state to
show that a juvenile deserves LWOP?
State Supreme Court says YES
State Supreme Court says NO
Parole is the presumed sentence and/or
the burden falls on the state to prove the
youth is eligible for LWOP

LWOP is the presumed sentence and/or
the burden falls on the juvenile
defendant to prove that s/he is ineligible
for an LWOP sentence

Connecticut Supreme Court

Arizona Supreme Court

State v. Riley, 110 A.3d 1205, 1214 (2015)

See State v. Valencia, 386 P.3d 392, 396
(Ariz. 2016) (at re-sentencing, the burden is
on defendants to show that they are
ineligible for LWOP)

(presumption in favor of parole)

Indiana Supreme Court

Virginia Supreme Court

Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 871 (Ind.

Jones v. Commonwealth, 795 S.E.2d 705, 715

2012) (burden on state to prove LWOP
appropriate)

(Va. 2017) (burden is on defendants to show
that they are ineligible for LWOP)

Iowa Supreme Court

Washington Supreme Court

State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 555 (Iowa

State v. Ramos, 387 P.3d 650, 663 (Wash.

2015) (presumption in favor of parole)

2017) (Washington Sentencing Reform Act
places burden of proof on juvenile defendant
to show by preponderance of evidence that
he or she should receive lower sentence)

Missouri Supreme Court

State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232, 241 (Mo. 2013)
(burden on state to show LWOP is
appropriate)
Utah Supreme Court

State v. Houston, 353 P.3d 55, 83 (Utah 2015)
(presumption in favor of parole)
Pennsylvania Supreme Court

There is no presumption in favor of
either sentence1
Nebraska Supreme Court

State v. Mantich, 888 N.W.2d 376, 384 (2016)
(no presumption against LWOP)

Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410, 433
(Pa. 2017) (presumption against LWOP and
burden on state to show juvenile is incapable
of rehabilitation)

Review of this issue granted by the State Supreme Court
The following courts have granted review to determine whether there needs to be a
presumption against juvenile LWOP at sentencing.
California Supreme Court

See News Release, Sup. Ct. of Cal., Summary of Cases Accepted and Related Actions During
Week of January 23, 2017 (Jan. 27, 2017), www.courts.ca.gov/documents/ws012317.pdf
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[https://perma.cc/859S-EB4D] (providing statement of the issue in People v. Arzate, No.
B259259, 2016 WL 5462821, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2016)).
North Carolina Supreme Court

State v. James, 796 S.E.2d 6 (N.C. 2017)
In State v. James, 786 S.E.2d 73 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016), the North Carolina Court of Appeals
held that the North Carolina sentencing statute creates a presumption in favor of LWOP for
juveniles, and that this is in compliance with Miller. The North Carolina Supreme Court
granted review of this decision on March 16, 2017.
1

If a state allows for juvenile LWOP sentences, but is not listed on this table, it means that their Supreme

Court has yet to determine if Miller or Montgomery creates a presumption against LWOP. Since their
sentencing statues do not establish a presumption in favor of either sentence, these states should be
considered to fall in the “no presumption in favor of either sentence” category.

